All titles in the text are listed with date of publication for the original language edition following in parentheses. In cases where an English translation exists, its year of publication is listed second. All translations unless otherwise indicated are my own.
2. Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, trans. Giacomo Donis, ed. Donis and David Webb (Cambridge, 2001), p. 62; hereafter abbreviated ATS. This book contains five dialogues between Ferraris and Derrida from July 1993 to November 1994, plus one between Gianni Vattimo and Derrida in January 1995. "Starting in the 1990s, Derrida's tendency to write in outline became even more pronounced as he delivered bits and pieces of [for example] a thesis on hospitality that one had to glean from a number of different texts" (Herman Rapaport, Later Derrida: Reading the Recent Work [New York, 2003 ], p. 26). Rapaport's book focuses on a range of topics, though not politics.
of Hélène Cixous that briefly sketches an account of genius. The political concerns of the first two books also appear, though in a more concise form, in the contemporaneous English-language casebook Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003) , which contains a revealing interview with Derrida (as well as Habermas) by Giovanna Borradori. The texts published in the opening years of the new century followed an immensely productive prior decade that included a spate of books gathering Derrida's many interviews, specifically Points . . . Interviews, 1974 Interviews, -1994 Interviews, (1992 Interviews, /1995 At a key point in the conversation with Ferraris, Derrida looked back over his career and revealed, "Each time I write a text, it is 'on occasion,' occasional, for some occasion. I have never planned to write a text; everything I've done, even the most composite of my books, were 'occasioned' by a question. My concern with the date and the signature confirms it." 2 Indeed, many of Derrida's texts give the appearance of being thrown together like preliminary thinking exercises, lacking editing, especially for economy and careful organization, performances that amble sometimes loosely, sometimes stunningly. About writing systematic treatises in Kantian fashion, Derrida declared, "It is no longer possible to write a great philosophical 'machine.' . . . I always operate through small oblique essays" 5. Derrida, Voyous (Paris, 2003), p. 12; hereafter abbreviated V. 6. Bennington notes, "There is no easy way to distinguish logical concerns from epistemological ones in Derrida, nor these from ethical or political ones" (Bennington, "Derrida and Politics," in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen [Cambridge, 2001] , p. 197). Meanwhile, Richard Beardsworth observes that "the domain of politics is not a privileged object of reflection for Derrida, although recent work of the 1990s has mobilized and reworked the term more immediately than that of the past" (Beardsworth, Derrida (ATS, p. 81). Concerning this generic obliqueness, Bennington notes kindly that "deconstruction happens more in the journey than the arrival," 3 and Royle observes that "all of Derrida's work is concerned with the appearance or apparitional effects of digression."
4 And yet concepts do regularly recur from one text to another and on occasion cluster in nodal points and condensations, bringing into view Derrida's infrastructure, his pharmacy, an ensemble of quasi-transcendental concepts, as in the case of sovereignty, a topic neither examined nor assessed with care elsewhere in the scholarly literature on late Derrida.
Sovereignty Deconstructed
In Voyous, for example, Derrida explores several main topics, particularly rogue states, reason, and sovereignty in relation to democracy. Titled "The Reason of the Strongest (Are There Rogue States?)," the first lengthy address, Derrida notes scrupulously, was delivered on the occasion of a conference on "The Democracy to Come" in July 2002 at Cerisy-la-Salle, while the second, shorter lecture, "The 'World' of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation, and Sovereignty)," took place at the University of Nice during August 2002 at the twenty-ninth Congress of the Association of French Language Societies of Philosophy. This much is clear about the book's title and topic from the preface: the rogue state "does not respect its state duties before the law of the world community and the obligations of international law; the state scoffs at the law-and mocks the condition of law."
5 A footnote to this definition immediately questions: "Does the reason of state always submit to the condition of law? Does sovereignty itself relieve it of the condition of law? Or else does it exceed and betray it, always as an exception, at the very moment it claims precisely to establish it?" (V, p. 12n). Derrida puts the concept of sovereignty in question at the outset, and the rogue state has everything to do with it. What happens in contemporary politics plays a leading role here, as Derrida illustrates in this and a dozen other late texts.
and the Political [London, 1996] , p. xi). Finally, in his otherwise excellent book Simon Critchley unconvincingly declares, "In my experience of reading Derrida, the closer one looks, the harder it is to find any substantial difference between earlier and later work" (Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Lévinas, and Contemporary French Thought [London, 1999] , p. 96). On the contrary, the later work appears both more haphazard and more preoccupied with politics and ethics. In his Derrida, Responsibility, and Politics (Brookfield, Vt., 1997), Morag Patrick defends Derrida against charges of ethicopolitical nihilism, and in the process he reviews many political criticisms launched against Derrida during his career. However, nothing is said about sovereignty, a key concern of Derrida's late work.
Preliminary observations on the politics of sovereignty appear in Seyla Benhabib, "Democracy and Difference: Reflections on the Metapolitics of Lyotard and Derrida," in Jacques Derrida, ed. Christopher Norris and David Roden, 4 vols. (London, 2003), esp. 4:221-28. This four-volume work reprints sixty-five articles and book chapters of critical reaction to Derrida dating from the 1970s to the new century. Despite its 1,600 pages and 22 topics, the critical legacy is highly selective, privileging philosophers and philosophy. Usually defined as supreme authority within a territory, linked with a historical sequence of sovereigns (God, king, people, nation, will), sovereignty among nation-states dates from the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), when interference in other states' governing prerogatives became unacceptable. Following Carl Schmitt, Derrida points out that "a sovereign is defined by his capacity to decide the exception [and he has] the right to suspend the law."
7 During modern democratic times this ontotheological right passes to the governing body or leader. In the U.S., for instance, it manifests itself in the right of the president to grant amnesty from judicial judgments. Moreover, a state's "monopoly on violence is of a piece with the motif of sovereignty. It is also what will always have grounded the death penalty, the right of the state, the right of the sovereign to punish by death." Among the most paradoxical features of sovereignty are the dynamics of time and language. The essential "indivisibility" of sovereignty is undermined by temporality and history as well as by discourse's soliciting of the other and its dividing of authority (V, p. 144). Derrida does not follow up on these provocative disruptions.
Here is another vexing trait of sovereignty: "The sovereign has the right not to respond; he has a right to the silence of this asymmetry. He has a right to a certain irresponsibility" (Derrida In addition to the death penalty, sovereignty enables a state to control its borders and exclude noncitizens as well as to protect itself from outside threats (today that includes forces of globalization and terrorism). In its practice, sovereignty remains connected with the use of force and the principle that might is right.
There are paradoxical nondemocratic features of sovereignty, as Derrida's various deconstructions strikingly demonstrate. Consider the contradictory idea of a sovereign (one over many), the concept of exception (being above the law), the notion of the death penalty (contravening the right to life of the citizen), and the fact that "only small states ever see their sovereignty contested and disputed by powerful states. . . . Powerful states never allow their own sovereignty to be challenged."
9 Additionally, the U.S. in special nondemocratic, contradictory ways not only "plays a virtually sovereign role among sovereign states" 10 but dominates the elite inner circle of the United Nations (the nondemocratic Security Council), exercising there a sovereign unilateralism:
As always, these two principles, democracy and sovereignty, are at once and by turns indissociable and in contradiction with each other. For democracy to be real, in order to grant space to a right to assert its idea, and to become actual, it requires the cratie [power] of the demos [people]-in this case of the global demos. Thus, it requires a sovereignty, namely a force stronger than all others in the world. But if the constitution of this force is indeed destined in principle to represent and protect this global democracy, it in fact betrays and threatens it at the outset.
[V, p. 143] Despite the terrible aporias of sovereignty in its modern democratic forms, Derrida aimed to preserve it, but in limited and shared forms. Such deconstructive questioning and sharing is, he realized, what is in any case happening.
The Derridean deconstruction of sovereignty is at once simple and complex. Part of the complexity has to do with sovereignty's bearing on ethics, law, and human relations. Here is Derrida assuming the role of political prophet in the context on the "war on terror": This movement of "deconstruction" did not wait for us to begin speaking about "deconstruction"; it has been under way for a long time, and it will continue for a long time. It will not take the form of a suppression of the sovereign state at one particular moment in time but will pass through a long series of still unforeseeable convulsions and transformations, through as yet unheard-of forms of shared and limited sovereignty. The idea and even the practice of shared sovereignty, that is, of a limitation of sovereignty, has been accepted for a long time now. And yet such a divisible or shared sovereignty already contradicts the pure concept of sovereignty. . . . The deconstruction of sovereignty has thus already begun, and it will have no end, for we neither can nor should renounce purely and simply the values of autonomy or freedom, or those of power or force, which are inseparable from the very idea of law. How are we to reconcile unconditional auto-nomy (the foundation of any pure ethics, of the sovereignty of the subject, of the ideal of emancipation and of freedom, and so on) and the hetero-nomy that . . . imposes itself upon all unconditional hospitality worthy of this name? [PTT, pp.
131-32]
In Derrida's nuanced account, the limiting and sharing of political sovereignty, however contradictory to its very concept, is going on (and will continue to do so), which is a good though risky thing. It is not just the modern system of nation-states and its international components that depends on sovereignty but also ethics, law, and so on. (More in a moment about this brow-raising "and so on.")
In its very operation, sovereignty functions through and with autonomy, freedom, force (they are essential). Each sovereign exhibits such traits, including, importantly, the modern citizen-subject. "Human rights pose and presuppose the human being as sovereign (equal, free, self-determined)" (V, p. 128). Furthermore, "All the fundamental axiomatics of responsibility or decision (ethical, juridical, political) are grounded on the sovereignty of the subject, that is, the intentional auto-determination of the conscious self (which is free, autonomous, active, etc.)" (WA, p. xix). Thus, concludes Derrida, one cannot simply jettison the sovereign self, its liberty, equality, responsibility, and power any more than the sovereign nation-state.
11. "To come to terms with responsibility, then, requires breaking with the horizon of subjectivity, or at least referring the experience of subjectivity-decision, choice, agency-to a constitutive alterity that precedes it and that it cannot comprehend. . . . Others and their traces are always working within us already, in a space and time that cannot be reduced to that of a consciousness or self-presence" (Thomas Keenan, Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics [Stanford, Calif., 1997], p. 66). Keenan's deconstructive discussions of subjectivity and alterity are lucid, although his de Manian attribution of alterity ultimately to language (rhetoric, text, literature, or fable) is too restrictive. Alterity arrives with time, the other, others, and the unconscious as well as with language in a contretemps. Heteronomy multiply grounds autonomy. Many others have reached the same unsurprising conclusion, though Derrida omits mentioning the copious scholarship on the topic. Derrida developed his position on the sovereign subject while realizing full well that the self of the citizen is, in fact, divided and multiple. Among innumerable statements on this topic, particularly concerning the unconscious and the other (as well as the other in me), here is a very telling one: "Instead of a subject conscious of itself, responding sovereignly by itself before the law, we can put in place the idea of a differentiated, divided 'subject,' not to be reduced to a conscious, egological intentionality. And a 'subject' established progressively, laboriously, nevertheless imperfectly, having conditions stabilized-that is, not natural, forever and essentially unstable-for its autonomy: on the ground, inexhaustible and invincible, of a heteronomy" (DQD, p. 286).
11 Significantly, Derrida has it both ways here ("yes, but" to the sovereign subject), as he does with the sovereign nation-state, and elsewhere, with the idea of sovereign asylum cities and sovereign universities.
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The concept of sovereignty reaches into many areas, starting with God and reason as sovereign. The significance of "and so on" is that the deconstruction of sovereignty-the double gesture of its erosion yet critical maintenance-is underway, and its scope remains unknown. Not only does the principle of sovereignty pop up in unexpected areas, but it invariably finds itself in a struggle of contending sovereignties (as those who work in universities know all too well). In Derrida's late texts, sovereignty extends to God, ruler, reason, nation-state, people, subject, the asylum city, university, and domicile.
In the citation above from Philosophy in a Time of Terror, Derrida abruptly juxtaposes unconditional and conditional hospitality in his discussion of sovereignty. Conditional or ordinary hospitality, by definition, offers welcome on condition that the other respects my rules and my way 14. Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge, 1986), p. 317.
15. In the late works, Derrida often speaks from the perspective of European politics, most prominently in The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), esp. pp. 76-80. This book contains an address from May 1990 to a colloquium on European cultural identity and an interview from January 1989. Derrida remained resolutely and self-consciously Eurocentric in philosophy and politics. For an unsympathetic account of Derrida's politics that is particularly dismissive of his messianic view of of life. Unconditional or pure hospitality opens itself fully to the unexpected and the unassimilable, wholly other. "These two hospitabilities are at once heterogeneous and indissociable" (PTT, p. 129); the one is the condition, is transcendent to the other, and the other is inconceivable without the one. In practice, conditional hospitality limits welcome while retaining control "over the limits of my 'home,' my sovereignty, my 'I can'" (PTT, p. 128).
13
Like the self, the domicile is sovereign.
In the closing pages of Voyous, Derrida looks back and helpfully observes, "Among the figures of unconditionality without sovereignty that have come to me to privilege in recent years would be, for example, that of unconditional hospitality" (V, p. 204), and he quickly lists others, including the gift, the pardon, justice, the impossible, reason, the event, and so on. Rodolphe Gasché long ago named similar doubled concepts, with their unconditional (transcendent) and conditional (ordinary) forms, "quasitranscendentals," which, he pointed out, "are situated at the margin of the distinctionbetween the transcendental and the empirical."
14 Unconditionality without sovereignty in Derrida's late work injects hope and idealism into politics.
Is it perhaps possible to think a sovereign without sovereignty? Yes, answers Derrida. Playing ironically off the title of Heidegger's famous interview in Der Spiegel, Derrida asked rhetorically, "How could you deny that the name 'god to come' just might be suitable for an ultimate form of sovereignty that would reconcile absolute justice with absolute law and thus, like all sovereignty and all law, with absolute force, with an absolute saving power?" (PTT, p. 190 n. 14). Here it is a matter of belief in the impossible, of messianicity without messianism (to use the terminology of Specters of Marx), of a democracy to come. The political form of this impossible messianic democratic sovereign without sovereignty might be, following Derrida, an international court of justice complete with its own autonomous force; or a democracy that takes into account the singularity of each existent beyond the social while respecting the social bond and legal equality; or an autonomous and democratic, unified, all-European force;
15 or a New In- There is a Derridean political pragmatism that operates under the name negotiation; it regularly develops the well-known double strategy/gesture signaled by the recurring deconstructive formula, sometimes too pat, on the one hand/on the other. About the matter of nation-state sovereignty, for instance, Derrida resolutely declared, "According to the situation, I am antisovereigntist or sovereigntist-and I claim the right to be antisovereigntist here and sovereigntist there" (DQD, p. 153). But insofar as Derrida was not an unconditional sovereigntist, he tipped his wily deconstructive hand, throwing sovereignty into question. In any case, sovereigntist and antisovereigntist are not two separate, dissociated positions; rather they haunt one another, as should be pointed out for other Derridean quasi-transcendental concepts. It is a matter of the conditionality of the unconditional, a key pragmatic feature of Derridean deconstruction.
In the address "On Forgiveness" a surprisingly stark moment occurs when the paradoxical dynamic of Derridean negotiation becomes clear. Here he takes off from the instance of forgiveness, both conditional and unconditional, the latter entailing an ideal noncalculating and gracious forgiving of the guilty as guilty without request or repentance:
These two poles, the unconditional and the conditional, are absolutely heterogeneous, and must remain irreducible to one another. They are nonetheless indissociable: if one wants, and it is necessary, forgiveness to be effective, concrete, historic; if one wants it to arrive, to happen by changing things, it is necessary that this purity engage itself in a series of conditions of all kinds (psychosociological, political, etc.). It is between these two poles, irreconcilable but indissociable, that decisions and responsibilities are to be taken. [OCF, p. 44] Simon Critchley and Richard Kearney cogently explain Derridean "negotiation" in their preface to On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness: "responsible political action and decision making consists in the negotiation between these two irreconcilable yet indissociable demands. On the one hand, pragmatic political or legal action has to be related to a moment of unconditionality or infinite responsibility if it is not going to be reduced to the prudential demands of the moment. . . . But, on the other hand, such unconditionality cannot, must not, Derrida insists, be permitted to programme political action" (OCF, pp. xi-xii). On the one hand/on the other. Double bond and double duty. Nota bene: Derridean unconditionals, such as pure hospitality, absolute forgiveness, or democracy to come, work on and in the future. Politics explicitly operates there. Yet for me it lacks materialist grip.
There is a further dimension to negotiation and forgiveness in the context of sovereignty. Here is a strikingly blunt statement from Derrida: "since we are speaking of forgiveness, what makes the 'I forgive' you sometimes unbearable or odious, even obscene, is the affirmation of sovereignty." The issue is condescension, arrogance, silencing. "Each time forgiveness is effectively exercised, it seems to suppose some sovereign power." Is there, then, a forgiveness without sovereignty? Derrida's dream was precisely a pure "forgiveness without power: unconditional but without sovereignty" (OCF, pp. 58, 59, 59).
The Derridean double bind of political pragmatics often raises the issue of responsibility in decision making (as above), a difficult topic amplified here and there across the late work. To make a decision when the path is clear, when knowledge points the way, when a rule applies is, according to Derrida, to follow a program and calculation, not in fact to make a decision at all. It entails good conscience, morality, but also irresponsibility. Conversely, responsible decision must bear antinomies and double binds. "The instant of decision must remain heterogeneous to all knowledge as such, to all theoretical or reportive determination, even if it may and must be preceded by all possible science and conscience. The latter are unable to determine the leap of decision . . . without depriving it of what makes it a sovereign and free decision."
16 A responsible decision stems from the sovereign subject, who makes an impossible mad leap. Such pure decision starkly opposes the ordinary variety, leaving us in a jam (each time permanently). Whereas earlier Derrida dreamt of forgiveness without sovereignty, here he projects an ideal responsibility dependent on sovereignty. What's it going to be? Sometimes a sovereigntist, sometimes an antisovereigntist: "Deconstruction begins there. It demands a difficult, almost impossible, but indispensable dissociation between unconditionality . . . and sovereignty (law, power, might). Deconstruction is on the side of uncon-17. A good biographical source is Catherine Malabou and Derrida, La Contre-allée (Paris, 1999), which provides an uncritical overview, but also a rich sampler of Derrida's work, including four dozen photos (mostly from his personal collection), fifteen postcards and letters sent from him to Malabou, a French Hegel scholar, in 1997-8, and a concluding curriculum vitae of Derrida.
18. Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York, 1994), p. 84; hereafter abbreviated SM. This book originated as a two-part plenary address to an April 1993 conference at the University of California, Riverside, entitled "Whither Marxism?" ditionality, even where it appears impossible, and not of sovereignty, even where it appears possible" (DQD, p. 153). This can stand as a summary statement on Derrida's vexing deconstruction of sovereignty.
Derridean Politics
All indications are that Jacques Derrida, a secular Algerian SephardicJew, was a democratic socialist with libertarian leanings as well as a strong cosmopolitan, someone who expected contemporary globalization, including market economics, technology, media, U.S. hegemony, and European integration to alter the world in many ways that compromise the sovereign democratic nation-state for good and ill.
17 Instances of good erosions of sovereignty for late Derrida include humanitarian interventions, the International Criminal Court, the concept of crimes against humanity, the end of the death penalty (outlawed in the European Union), and the work of certain nongovernmental organizations. "We should salute what is heralded today in the reflection on the right of interference or intervention in the name of what is obscurely and sometimes hypocritically called the humanitarian, thereby limiting the sovereignty of the State in certain conditions."
18
This nuanced praise of sovereignty's erosion is sometimes balanced by Derrida's defenses of the sovereign democratic nation-state, especially in cases where it fends off the global hegemony of one language, of capital concentration, of one neoliberal market, of terrorism, of weapons proliferation. "The presence of the state must be limited, but that presence can be vital. And it can take only a contradictory form in constant readjustment: to struggle against structures of violent and abusive appropriation, monopolization, and standardization, to defend the rights and potential of (national and international) culture, to liberate space and forces to that end, without, however, programming, inducing, orienting-in any case, as little as possible" (N, p. 67). Under certain conditions, Derrida said yes to the modern sovereign nation-state in its democratic, nonauthoritarian, socialist form. Unfortunately, he was not forthcoming on what democratic socialism might look like.
But in no case could Derridean politics have been communitarian. After examining at length the democratic notion of fraternity (liberty, equality, fraternity), Derrida revealed "I was wondering why the word 'community' . . . why I have never been able to write it, on my own initiative and in my name, as it were."
19 His corrosive critique of fraternity is underwritten by an almost instinctive distrust of community. In the dialogue with Ferraris, Derrida demanded, "Do not consider me 'one of you,' 'don't count me in,' I want to keep my freedom, always: this, for me, is the condition not only for being singular and other, but also for entering into relation with the singularity and alterity of others" (ATS, p. 27). Moreover, to Vattimo he very poignantly declared, "Place, family, language, culture, are not my own, there are no places that 'belong.' . . . My relation to these seemingly communal structures is one of expropriation, of disownership. . . . My point of departure is there where this belonging has broken" (ATS, p. 85). During the dialogue with Roudinesco, Derrida connected his discomfit about community to childhood experiences of being identified and typed with hostility as a Jew (see DQD, pp. 182-85).
20 In Marx & Sons, he admitted, "I am, even today, I must confess-this is, moreover, easy to see-rather insensitive to any 'sense of comradeship.'" 21 Not surprisingly, Derrida remained suspicious of such key political categories as social class, party politics, nationalism. And unlike Wallerstein, Laclau and Mouffe, Hardt and Negri, and other leading contemporary Left political thinkers, he did not put stock in the new social movements, 22 which in the contemporary period arguably displace party and class as innovative political forces. While I sympathize with Derrida's query in 1989, "Need I remind people that I've always been on the left?" (N, p. 164), I understand people's perplexity. I was and am perplexed. The intensity of broken belonging and the strength accorded the sovereign self cast a long rightward-leaning libertarian shadow over Derrida's left-wing democratic politics. And while I concur with Derrida's self-assessment, "I am not an anarchist," I find more telling yet coy the rider, "Deconstruction is undoubtedly anarchic" (N, p. 22).
Derrida's most well-known political statement remains, in retrospect,his condemnation of the ten plagues of the post-cold war New World Order in Specters of Marx. He stood by this sweeping indictment until the end. In summary, these evils, familiar from leftist work, include, first, spreading unemployment, underemployment, and social inactivity, often resulting from calculated deregulation. Second, the massive exclusion from political participation of the homeless and the widespread expulsion of exiles, immigrants, and stateless persons. Third, the economic warfare between the U.S., Europe, and Japan, which commands disproportionate international resources. (With its admission during the late 1990s into the World Trade Organization, China should now be added.) Fourth, the contradictions between the values of the free market and protectionist barriers and interventionist policies. Fifth, the external debt holding large segments of humanity in thrall, contradictorily excluding them from the market. Sixth, the massive arms trafficking that links scientific research, commerce, and workers' interests such that its suspension would entail major economic dislocations. Seventh, the proliferation of atomic weapons beyond state and market controls. Eighth, the multiplication of ethnic wars guided by irredentist dreams of original homelands and fears of territorial displacements. Ninth, the spread of profit-maximizing virtual states, organized by drug consortia and mafia, that worldwide infiltrate economic and social systems as well as political institutions. Tenth, most significant in the present context, the unequal application of international law in the interests of certain powerful states devoted to national sovereignty, backed by technical, economic, and military might (see SM, pp. 81-84).
Derrida should have listed other evils of globalization, notably, environmental degradation; feminization of poverty; the spread of national security apparatuses, secret bases, militarized states, and the bombing of civilians; dedication to quick profits, speedups, short-term goals, systematic exploitation; worsening conditions in and spread of urban ghettoes and racial enclaves; and increasing privatization and uneven distribution of basic resources, particularly food, water, energy, land, education, medical care, and credit.
23 Wide-ranging and detailed critiques of Specters of Marx appear in
Recall that Foucault criticized theories of power based on sovereignty as wrongheaded and blind to modern capillary biopower: "At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king. Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty" (Michel Foucault Ghostly Demarcations (1999) , where nine critics, among them Ahmad, Eagleton, Jameson, Macherey, and Negri, respond, some sympathetically, some dismissively, others carefully and critically. Several criticisms aptly recur in this revealing casebook: Derrida reads Marx too selectively; he jettisons the useful concepts of ideology, social class, base/superstructure, and exploitation; he lapses into philosophically idealist mystical, sometimes religious, thinking; he skirts practical politics, appearing to be antipolitics; he is voluntaristic and advocates reform, not revolutionary, socialism.
The key notions of Derrida's inventive political philosophy in the late works remain, in my judgment, democracy to come, unconditional justice, pure hospitality, and the messianic without messianism, famously first assembled in Specters of Marx and featured regularly thereafter. These Derridean ideals, phantoms, specters, stemming from or shared by the Enlightenment and modernity, haunt the present, orienting critique and doing political work. There is a peak moment in Specters of Marx when Derrida summons the coming of a singular other, an event calling for unconditional hospitality, the incalculable and unexpected (although much anticipated and hoped for) impossible messianic democracy to come, figured as a guest, a foreigner "who or which will not be asked to commit to the domestic contracts of any welcoming power (family, State, nation, territory, native soil or blood, language, culture in general, even humanity), just opening which renounces any right to property, and right in general" (SM, p. 65). How does one characterize this vision, this eccentric political projection, a peculiar assemblage of libertarian, liberal, communist, cosmopolitan, and utopian ideas?
24 How do things stand with sovereignty in 25. See, for example, WA, pp. 242, 251, 260, and chapter 6 of DQD, "L'Esprit de la révolution," pp. 129-74, esp. pp. 138-39. this scenario? Clearly, the sovereign subject as spectral foreign guest precedes and outweighs the usual sovereignties of home, nation-state, and cultural belonging. That sums up Derridean politics, a suggestive yet troubling mix, on occasion glibly reduced by him to formulas like unconditional/ conditional, ideal/practical, on the one hand/on the other that generate toopredictable paradoxes.
The telling tableau from Specters of Marx begins with Derrida self-consciously bracketing political pragmatics and negotiation, pitting the "infinite promise" against "the determined, necessary, but also necessarily inadequate forms of what has to be measured against this promise" (SM, p. 65). In more than one place, Derrida in the late work equated the messianic event, justice, and democracy to come with revolution depicted as an interruption, a radical break in the ordinary course of history, a rupture with a system of dominant norms or programs.
25 Derrida believed in "revolution," foreseeing, however, that it must, pragmatically speaking, "come to terms with the impossible, negotiate the non-negotiable that has remained non-negotiable, calculate with the unconditional as such, with the inflexible unconditionality of the unconditional" (WA, p. 277). Yet revolution appears unlikely under such conditions; it seems just so much speculation.
The final tableau I want to evoke occurs in Voyous when Derrida generalizes, quite shockingly at first, by saying that "the States waging war on rogue States are themselves, in their most legitimate sovereignty, rogue States abusing their power. As soon as there is sovereignty, there is abuse of power and rogue State. . . . Thus there are only rogue States. Potentially or actually. The State is roguish" (V, pp. 145-46). Because it is in the nature of sovereignty to seek supremacy and use force, the special epithet rogue state, Derrida argues, is misleading and should be scrapped. (No doubt some states are more roguish than others, notably superpowers with supersovereignty who unilaterally break international laws and agreements.) In any case, insofar as the recent "war on terrorism" is not state-based, the era of rogue states appears behind us, despite President George W. Bush's doubtlessly comforting, but misleading reactivation of the category. What is most shocking in Derrida's generalization is the severity of his critique of political sovereignty and the nation-state. The category of the rogue state becomes useless as well as hypocritical, and faith in the modern form of the state appears paper thin at this moment. 
Judging Derrida
Having read more than a dozen volumes of Derrida's late works, not to mention many of the early works, I am most appreciative, particularly with De quoi demain, Negotiations, Voyous, and Philosophy in a Time of Terror in mind, of his originality and inventiveness, manifested readily in such suggestive, though spectral, quasi-transcendental political concepts as hospitality, justice, the messianic, and democracy to come, all created in the course of his deconstruction of their ordinary forms. The well-known Derridean critique of traditional binary concepts and the eccentric focus on margins remain today powerful tools of analysis. Derrida's commitments to democracy, justice, and internationalism showed him a politicaloptimist, while his ubiquitous nuances and qualifications displayed a seasoned skepticism alert to conscious and unconscious deceptions. It goes without saying that Derrida was a uniquely gifted reader of texts-very often canonical works-and was capable of finding motifs previously, in retrospect surprisingly, unnoticed. The specters uncovered in Marx's works are astonishing, as is their linkage with Shakespeare's ghost in Hamlet. The readings of Kant scattered across the late works, incisive and productive, should be gathered in a Derrida on Kant sampler under such political headings as cosmopolitanism, responsibility, decision, justice, forgiveness, force,reason (that is, "reason of state"). Derrida's creative application of psychoanalysis to politics significantly shaped his accounts of otherness, subjectivity, fraternity, and spectrality, justifying with renewed vigor continued psychoanalytical research in an increasingly discouraging environment. I appreciate Derrida's warnings, though often too broad, about the roles of family, comradeship, community, party, and the nation-state in politics. These are useful caveats. Although suspicious of the concept of hegemony as too homogenizing, he applied it helpfully and judiciously in the late works, usually to characterize expansive U.S. power in the plural (hegemonies). Derrida's adamant secularism should be admired, but I am not so sure about his dabbling in religion, even though after September 11 it is difficult for secularists like me to continue simply dismissing religion, much as I want to. Finally, the way I see things, the end of the cold war and the rise of the U.S. empire, plus the culture wars that started during the 1980s, awakened academics to the role of the public intellectual. It was not the Heidegger or de Man affairs of 1987 that actually did so. Many of the dozens of late works by Derrida respond directly to this epochal transformation.
In this light the famous invocation of the emerging New International in Specters of Marx, thoroughly counterintuitive, remains heartening, yet too abstract. I'll take the World Social Forum while I await the arrival of Derrida's New International.
There is more to criticize in Derrida's work, and the literature in this area is voluminous. Beyond the points I have already made and cited, I would mention several key matters, including those missing in Derrida's worksuch as popular culture, everyday life, capillary power, corporeality-and matters avoided-social class, ideology, mode of production. It is a question here primarily of pragmatically oriented historical materialism. How can one talk effectively about long-standing systematic social inequalities in the absence of some such categories? The Derridean notion of logocentrism that covers the period from Plato to Lévi-Strauss will not do; it is ahistorical, disembodied, flat. Late capitalism works better; it is fully historicized, materially grounded, broadly explanatory. Finally, I am surprised and disappointed by the absence of defenses of the welfare state that one would have expected from Derrida and that the Left so obviously very much needs to mount in these times of triumphant neoliberal capitalism. The welfare state is a significant achievement of human civilization.
In a recent article, Gayatri Spivak concludes that a key task is "to wrench deconstruction from its proper home in 'Comparative Literature,' to let it loose in 'Cultural Studies' so that it can transform its nice nursery of hybrid plantings to reveal the saturnalia of an imagined counter-globalization."
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Against the U.S. background of an atrophying comparative literature and a thriving, though often shallow and overextended cultural studies, deconstruction needs to migrate and transform globalization studies. This scenario, tellingly, addresses deconstruction both as Derridean philosophyand as an interdisciplinary movement characterized by a dissident deportment, a (dis)respect for tradition, and an antinomian and anarchistic sensibility given to internationalist political criticism and work. 28 Of course, Spivak the global capitalist economy as a discursively hegemonic entity." In his famous 1983 lecture "The Principle of Reason," Derrida sounds a revealing note of caution at one point: "We are in an implacable political topography: one step further in view of greater profundity or radicalization, even going beyond the 'profound' and the 'radical,' the principial, the arche, one step further toward a sort of original an-archy risks producing or reproducing the hierarchy. has long been a poster person for this project while remaining critical of its Eurocentrism and its (mis)handling of subalterns. What is encouraging here for Spivak, and for me, is deconstruction's movement in Derrida's late works not only to politics but to social science-a trajectory followed by cultural studies, although the latter foregrounds sociology more than political science, history, economics, and international relations. Deconstruction's reckoning with sociology is for the future perhaps. Meanwhile, one of the many forms of counterglobalization evoked by Derrida is an archipelago of rogue groups, a roguocracy to use his term, which transgresses nation-state power and poses a countersovereignty to the sovereign state.
